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The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other 
Insurance” Clause by Another Name 
Christopher C. French* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a corporate policyholder that is facing tens of millions or 
even hundreds of millions of dollars in liabilities for events and injuries 
that occurred years, if not decades, in the past.  These liabilities threaten 
the very financial solvency and future of the company.  Imagine further 
that, although the policyholder has dozens of insurers and insurance 
policies to cover the liabilities, none of its insurers agrees to pay 
anything.  Instead, in addition to a litany of defenses that the 
policyholder is forced to defeat through years of litigation, at the end of 
that long fight each insurer contends that it nonetheless should have no 
liability because insurers other than itself should pay instead.  Now, 
imagine being the judge who must decide which of the dozens of insurers 
should pay and how much each one should pay.  The scenario described 
above is not fictional.  It is a scenario that plays out regularly in the 
world of insurance coverage litigation regarding long-tail liability claims. 
One of the most factually and legally complex issues courts are 
asked to resolve in insurance coverage disputes that involve long-tail 
claims such as asbestos bodily injury claims and environmental claims, 
which have damage processes that span multiple policy years, is how the 
liabilities associated with the claims should be allocated among the 
numerous policy years that often are triggered by such losses.  The 
courts’ resolution of this critical issue may shift responsibility for 
millions or tens of millions of dollars of liabilities from one party to 
another. 
                                                     
 * Partner, K&L Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Adjunct Professor of Insurance Law, 
Duquesne Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Columbia University.  The author 
gratefully acknowledges the legal research contributions of Kimberly Geary, Gregory Sturges, and 
Cody Corliss to this Article.  The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of K&L Gates LLP or any of its clients. 
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Because insurance companies are in the business of making 
money—that is, their goal is to pay out less money in claims payments 
and costs of doing business than they receive in premiums and 
investment income—they continuously are looking for ways to minimize 
or eliminate their obligations to pay long-tail claims even after it has 
been determined that their policies have been triggered by a loss.  To that 
end, certain insurers have turned to a provision often found in 
commercial general liability (CGL) policies—the “Prior Insurance and 
Non-Cumulation of Liability Clause,” referred to herein simply as the 
“non-cumulation clause”—as a linguistic vehicle they attempt to use to 
minimize or eliminate their payment obligations after a court or jury has 
determined that their policies have been triggered by a loss. 
The non-cumulation clause commonly found in historical London 
market umbrella liability policies, for example, states as follows: 
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole 
or in part under any other excess policy issued to the Assured prior to 
the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon . . . shall be 
reduced by any amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss 
under such prior insurance.1 
In essence, the insurers’ argument is that the non-cumulation clause 
shifts the responsibility for paying for losses that trigger multiple policy 
years to any and all triggered insurance policies that were issued prior to 
their own policy year.  Thus, even after it has been determined that the 
loss triggers their policy year, these insurers point to the non-cumulation 
clause and then attempt to reduce, or completely eliminate, their payment 
obligations on the grounds that all of the liabilities associated with the 
loss should be reallocated to only policy years that predate their own 
(invariably another insurer’s policy year).  Under the insurers’ argument, 
if the policies in the earlier triggered policy years have unpaid limits, 
then the limits of those policies should pay until their limits are 
exhausted.  If the limits of the policies in the earlier triggered policy 
years have been exhausted by settlements or prior payments of unrelated 
claims, then, according to these insurers, the policyholder becomes self-
insured for the remaining amount of the loss—that is, the policyholder 
receives nothing from the insurers, even though the policyholder paid a  
                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Del. 
2010); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., Nos. A-6706-01T5, A-6720-01T5, 
2004 WL 1878764, at *19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 8, 2004) (per curiam). 
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premium for the policies, the policies have been triggered, and the 
policies’ limits have not been exhausted. 
This Article explains that non-cumulation clauses were never 
intended to apply to long-tail claims in the manner certain insurers now 
contend they should.  When the clauses were first drafted, the original 
drafters of the clauses did not intend for the clauses to apply to long-tail 
claims—like asbestos bodily injury and environmental property 
damage—because such claims were not even recognized as such, and the 
allocation schemes developed to address such claims had not yet been 
adopted by the courts. 
Indeed, non-cumulation clauses such as the London version quoted 
above are hopelessly ambiguous when applied to long-tail claims.  This 
ambiguity is revealed when one attempts to apply the clause literally to 
long-tail claims by considering questions such as the following: How 
does one determine whether a loss is “covered” under a prior-incepting 
policy when the prior-incepting policy has not been included in the case 
because of settlements, exhaustion, or some other reason?  Must the 
issuer of the prior-incepting policy admit, which is unlikely, that its 
policy “covers” the loss?  How can amounts be “due” from insurers from 
which the policyholder is not even seeking to recover?  To whom would 
the amount be “due” in such circumstances?  Is an adjudication required 
regarding the responsibilities of the prior-incepting policies before 
amounts are “due” from them?  Would such a result even be legally 
binding on insurers that issued the prior-incepting policies if they are not 
parties in the case?  These are just a few of the questions that reveal the 
ambiguity of non-cumulation clauses when they are applied to long-tail 
claims. 
This ambiguity is further highlighted by the fact that the courts that 
have attempted to apply such clauses cannot agree on the clauses’ 
meaning or application.  Stated differently, it is hornbook insurance law 
that a non-cumulation clause must be “unambiguous”—have only one 
reasonable meaning—when applied to long-tail claims before the 
insurer’s argument seeking to defeat coverage can be accepted.  Yet, if 
the numerous courts that have considered such clauses—including the 
courts that have held such clauses are “unambiguous”—cannot even 
agree on the meaning and application of such clauses, how can such 
clauses be “unambiguous”? 
In addition to this introduction and a conclusion, this Article 
examines the interpretation and application of non-cumulation clauses 
with respect to long-tail claims in four parts.  Part II sets forth the factual 
background necessary to discuss the issue, which includes the typical 
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structure of commercial insurance programs, the nature of long-tail 
claims, the various trigger and allocation schemes that have been adopted 
by the courts, and the history of the drafting of one of the most common 
versions of the clause—the London version.  Part III examines the 
courts’ inconsistent interpretations and applications of non-cumulation 
clauses.  Part IV discusses the principles of insurance policy 
interpretation—such as the doctrines of contra proferentem and 
“reasonable expectations”—and how such principles apply to the 
interpretation and application of non-cumulation clauses to long-tail 
claims.  Finally, Part V suggests the proper interpretation and application 
of non-cumulation clauses in the context of long-tail claims.  This Article 
concludes that non-cumulation clauses, using the London version as an 
example, are ambiguous when applied to long-tail claims.  Consequently, 
courts should construe the clauses in favor of the policyholder such that 
the policyholder can and should recover the full amount of its covered 
liabilities to the extent the triggered policies’ limits are sufficient.  
Because non-cumulation clauses purport to shift liability for a loss from 
one insurer to another insurer, they essentially are variations of “other 
insurance” clauses.  Thus, after the policyholder has been paid in full for 
its covered liabilities, the non-cumulation clause should apply, if at all, in 
contribution claims between insurers to determine their respective 
obligations in the same manner as “other insurance” clauses. 
II. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND IN WHICH NON-
CUMULATION CLAUSES ARE INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
A. Typical Insurance Programs 
Historically, many commercial policyholders have purchased 
“occurrence”-based liability insurance annually to ensure that they have 
seamless coverage for losses that span multiple policy periods.  Such 
programs typically have multiple layers of coverage with primary 
insurance at the lowest level and excess insurance above the primary 
insurance, with the total limits of insurance in each policy year 
increasing as time moves forward.2  The policy language in all of the 
policies in the various policy years often is the same or similar because 
commercial liability insurance policies are drafted by the insurance 
                                                     
 2. See infra Figure 1. 
FRENCH FINAL 1/3/2012  11:36 AM 
2011] AN “OTHER INSURANCE” CLAUSE BY ANOTHER NAME 379 
industry and used by most insurers.3  A graphic depiction of a typical 
insurance program of a commercial policyholder appears in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Typical Insurance Program of a Commercial Policyholder 
Under the hypothetical insurance program reflected in Figure 1, if a 
covered liability in the amount of $18 million triggered only the 1984 
policy year, then Insurer H would pay the first $5 million, Insurer D 
would pay the next $5 million, Insurer E would pay the next $5 million, 
and Insurer F would pay the final $3 million.  In long-tail claims where a 
covered liability implicates multiple years and layers of coverage, the 
determination of each insurer’s liability is more complex.  For example, 
assume that a covered loss totals $30 million and it has been determined 
that the damage process giving rise to the liability began in 1980 and 
ended in 1986.  What is Insurer E’s coverage obligation?  As one might 
suspect, answering that question is a more difficult task. 
                                                     
 3. See, e.g., HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 129.1 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that the 
“insurance industry voluntarily set about to standardize CGL insurance contract language”); Nancy 
Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General 
Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610, 622–23 (1990) (noting that in the 1940s, 
“the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (‘NBCU’), consisting of employee-representatives of 
stock insurance companies, and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (‘MIRB’), consisting of 
employee-representatives of mutual insurance companies,” jointly drafted the basic provisions of the 
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B. Typical Long-Tail Claims: Asbestos Bodily Injury and 
Environmental Property Damage 
 Asbestos bodily injury and environmental property damage claims 
are typical long-tail claims.4  Asbestos was used in numerous products—
from gloves to insulation—because of its heat-retardant qualities.5  
Consequently, an individual’s exposure to asbestos historically may have 
occurred in numerous places over the course of many years.6  Once 
asbestos fibers enter an individual’s lungs, a progressive disease process 
can begin that progresses over many years and ultimately can result in 
deadly diseases such as mesothelioma and lung cancer.7 
                                                     
 4. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance 
After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 375 (2006) (“Because injury continues to 
be inflicted anew by asbestos fibers in the lungs, consecutive liability policies are triggered.”).  For a 
detailed discussion of insurance and asbestos liability, see, for example, id. 
 5. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 77 F.3d 603, 606 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“Asbestos is a flame-retardant and heat-resistant fibrous mineral that was commonly used in 
fireproofing in buildings, ships, and protective fireproof garments at least as early as the nineteenth 
century.”); Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1571, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam) (“Due to the heat resistant and fire retardant properties of asbestos it was used in insulating 
ships’ boilers, steam pipes, pumps, and other equipment.”); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 
493 F.2d 1076, 1083 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[Asbestos] was used as an insulator against heat as early 
as 1866, and asbestos cement was introduced about 1870.”); STEPHEN G. CARROLL, ET AL., RAND 
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 11 (2005) (noting the wide use of asbestos because 
the product is “strong, durable, and has excellent fire-retardant capability”), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf. 
 6. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 5, at 11–12. 
 7. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 168 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Cancers caused by asbestos have long periods of latency.  
Their symptoms do not become manifest for decades after exposure.”); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. 
Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1198 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]here is a period of time prior 
to the point at which asbestosis and pleural plaques are clinically diagnosable when the condition is 
evolving cumulatively or incrementally.  This period when the asbestosis or pleural plaques develop 
undetected is the latency period, which is normally 15 years and may be as long as 40 years.  The 
latency period begins at the time of initial exposure to asbestos and ends with the onset of symptoms 
and diagnosis.  From the time of exposure, asbestos fibers are readily inhaled into the lungs and can 
immediately injure the cells by causing inflammation and scarring.  The disease process for a person 
who develops asbestosis begins within days of initial exposure to asbestos and continues for 
decades.  How far this disease process progresses depends upon the quantity of asbestos inhaled and 
deposited in the lungs.”); Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083 (noting the progressive nature of asbestos-related 
diseases following asbestos exposure); Pack v. Artuz, 348 F. Supp. 2d 63, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“Exposure to friable asbestos poses a significant health risk because airborne particles or fibers can 
become lodged in a person’s lungs and in his respiratory tract.  Over time this can lead to asbestosis, 
a nonmalignant scarring of the lungs that causes extreme shortness of breath and often death; lung 
cancer; gastrointestinal cancer; and mesothelioma, a cancer of the lung lining or abdomen lining that 
develops as long as thirty years after the first exposure to asbestos and that, once developed, 
invariably and rapidly causes death.”  (citing Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 
F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
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Similarly, a typical environmental property damage claim arises as 
follows: a policyholder operated a manufacturing plant for decades that 
resulted in the release of contaminants at and around the plant site itself 
or in waste sites such as landfills.  Once the contaminants entered the soil 
or groundwater, they continuously spread through the soil and 
groundwater over many years until they were discovered and 
remediated.8  The policyholder then faces liability to a governmental 
entity or to a private party for the cleanup of the contaminated property.9 
Thus, two key questions face policyholders, liability insurers, and 
courts when determining insurers’ coverage responsibility for these types 
of long-tail claims.  One, which policy years are implicated or 
“triggered” by the covered loss?  Two, how much of the covered loss 
should each insurer whose policy has been triggered pay? 
C. Trigger of Coverage 
Courts’ answer to the first question—which policy year or years are 
triggered by the liability—has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.10  
                                                     
 8. See, e.g., Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 F.3d 976, 980–81 
(3d Cir. 1995) (noting that contaminants released and spread continuously through groundwater); 
Cont’l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 979–80 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (noting 
that toxic substances may spread through the soil over time following disposal); N. States Power Co. 
v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994) (en banc) (noting that soil and 
groundwater contamination is a continuous process); Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 778 
N.W.2d 433, 445 (Neb. 2010) (finding soil and groundwater contamination from trichloroethylene 
and trichloroethane was a continuous process following disposal). 
 9. See, e.g., Ne. Pharm. & Chem, 842 F.2d at 980; Chem. Leaman, 89 F.3d at 981. 
 10. Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Event Triggering Liability Insurance Coverage as 
Occurring Within Period of Time Covered by Liability Insurance Policy Where Injury or Damage is 
Delayed—Modern Cases, 14 A.L.R.5th 695, 722 (1993) (“Some courts hold that coverage is 
triggered continuously throughout the entire time period from exposure to manifestation.  Other 
courts have determined the trigger-of-coverage issue by ascertaining the time of actual damage or 
injury-in-fact.  In some jurisdictions . . . the issue appears undecided, at least as a general rule.”  
(citations omitted)).  For a general discussion of coverage triggers in various claim situations, see, 
for example, Kenneth S. Abraham, Essay, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 
VA. L. REV. 85, 95–96 (2001) (noting the advent of long-tail coverage); Mark W. Dykes, 
Occurrences, Accidents, and Expectations: A Primer of These (and Some Other) Insurance-Law 
Concepts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 831, 838–40 (2003) (discussing policy language and claims used to 
trigger coverage); James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The 
Debate over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625 (1997) (describing triggers in 
mass tort litigation claims); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk–
Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1700–01 (2007) (distinguishing “exposure,” “injury-in-fact,” 
and “exposure in residence” triggers for progressive diseases); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance 
Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1563–69 (2010) 
(discussing asbestos cases and application of the continuous trigger); Nicolas R. Andrea, Comment, 
Exposure, Manifestation of Loss, Injury-in-Fact, Continuous Trigger: The Insurance Coverage 
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Some courts have adopted an “exposure” trigger, which means those 
insurers whose policies provided coverage at the time of exposure are 
triggered.11  Other courts have adopted an “injury in fact” trigger, which 
means the liability policies on the risk when the injury actually occurs 
are triggered.12  Other courts have adopted a “manifestation” trigger, 
                                                                                                                       
Quagmire, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 813 (1994) (discussing divergent triggering theories); Chandra Lantz, 
Note, Triggering Coverage of Progressive Property Loss: Preserving the Distinctions Between 
First- and Third-Party Insurance Cases, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801, 1804–05 (1994) (noting 
triggering rules). 
 11. See, e.g., Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 
365, 372 (5th Cir. 1993) (apportioning cost of policyholder’s defense among insurers on risk and 
finding that the policyholder must bear its share of defense costs determined by fraction of time it 
lacked coverage); Cont’l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Phar. & Chem. Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 
1987) (“Environmental damage occurs at the moment that hazardous wastes are improperly released 
into the environment[,] and [the] liability policy in effect at the time this damage is caused provides 
coverage.” (footnote omitted)), aff’d in part, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Clemtex, Inc. v. 
Se. Fid. Ins. Co., 807 F.2d 1271, 1276 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that tissue damage takes place upon 
initial inhalation of asbestos); Hancock Labs., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 
1985) (“[T]he California Supreme Court would adopt the exposure theory to determine when bodily 
injury occurs.”); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(endorsing exposure theory where “it is impossible practically to determine the point at which the 
fibers actually imbed themselves in the victim’s lungs”); Ducre v. Exec. Officers of Halter Marine, 
Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 992 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying exposure theory to insurance coverage for 
asbestosis); TBG, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 1444, 1452–53 (N.D. Cal. 1990) 
(applying exposure trigger theory where each release of the hazardous substance triggered the 
policy); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., No. C84-1224A, 1986 WL 191786, at *12 
(N.D. Ohio May 22, 1986) (“The trigger of coverage is the exposure which causes personal injury 
regardless of the time of the injury.”); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 632 
F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that insurance duty to defend triggered at ingestion of 
harmful substance from which such claims arise); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 
451 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (“[E]ach insurer on the risk when a currently deceased 
plaintiff was allegedly exposed is obligated to acknowledge coverage and to provide a defense and 
possibly indemnification.”), aff’d, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 
1981); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1076–77 (La. 1992) (applying exposure trigger). 
 12. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 166–69 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(per curiam) (holding that “coverage for [products liability] is triggered at times of actual injury” and 
that “injury-in-fact can . . . include . . . the inevitable pre-disposition to illness or disability . . . 
caused by [the exposure]”); Asbestos Claims Mgmt., 73 F.3d at 1195 (applying the “injury-in-fact” 
trigger to progressive diseases); Md. Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 627 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(“The actual injury to property—the presence of the asbestos hazard—occurs upon installation and 
exists regardless of whether it yet has been discovered by the building owners.”); Abex Corp. v. Md. 
Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the “insurer’s obligation to indemnify . . . 
arises when the asbestos causes real bodily injury during the policy period”); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that “an actual injury must 
occur during the time the policy is in effect in order to be indemnifiable”); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1389 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that injury in fact occurred within 
approximately two weeks of spraying of Agent Orange); New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F. 
Supp. 99, 102 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that coverage for property damage is triggered when 
property is “‘injured in fact’”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 
1991); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding 
that liability coverage is triggered by occurrence of an injury in fact during the policy period); Am. 
Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that 
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which means the policies on the risk when the injury or disease 
manifests—that is, when a medical diagnosis is made or adverse health 
symptoms first appear—are triggered.13  Finally, other courts have 
adopted a “continuous” trigger, which means all of the policyholder’s 
liability policies on the risk from the time of initial exposure until the 
injury or disease manifests are triggered.14 
                                                                                                                       
“to establish . . . liability the insured must prove that an ‘occurrence’—injury, sickness, or disease—
arose during the policy period,” but the injury need not manifest during the policy period), aff’d as 
modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984); Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (endorsing an injury-in-fact analysis); Monsanto Co. v. 
C.E. Heath Comp. & Liab. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 30, 34–35 (Del. 1994) (holding that “[a] policy is 
activated by bodily injury or property damage that takes place ‘during the policy period’”); Cortland 
Pump & Equip. Inc. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, 604 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) 
(applying an injury-in-fact standard to property damage). 
 13. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 118 (D. 
Mass. 1981) (applying manifestation trigger), modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 14. See, e.g., AC&S, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding 
“exposure, exposure-in-residence, and manifestation each trigger coverage”); Keene Corp. v. Ins. 
Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[E]ach insurer on the risk between the initial 
exposure and the manifestation of disease is liable to [the insured] for indemnification and defense 
costs.”); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., No. 94-CV-1464, 1995 WL 
854763, at *8 (D. Kan. Sept. 18, 1995) (triggering all CGL policies in force between exposure and 
manifestation), rev’d on other grounds, No. 75,227, 1997 WL 1048134 (Kan. Jan. 31, 1997); 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sussex Cnty., 831 F. Supp. 1111, 1124 (D. Del. 1993) (applying 
continuous trigger where “it is impossible to identify a precise point in time when property damage 
occurs from the leaching of pollutants”), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994); Chem. Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1153 (D.N.J. 1993) (applying continuous 
trigger theory for environmental claims), aff’d in part & remanded, 89 F.3d 976 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 881, 885 (N.D. W. Va. 1991) (applying 
New Jersey law that policies are triggered during the “‘continuous period from exposure to the 
manifestation of damages’” (quoting Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443, 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1990))), aff’d, 957 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1992); Time Oil Co. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 743 F. Supp. 1400, 1417 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (noting that Washington has adopted a continuous 
trigger theory); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D. 
Colo. 1989) (adopting continuous trigger for policies spanning eight years), rev’d on other grounds, 
954 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992); New Castle Cnty. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 812 (D. Del. 
1989) (“[A]n entire injurious process may constitute ‘injury’ under the terms of the policies.”), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom, New Castle Cnty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 
(3d Cir. 1991), abrogated by sub nom., N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., 942 F.2d 189 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem., Co., 707 F. Supp. 762, 768 
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (applying continuous trigger of coverage), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 25 F.3d 177 
(3d Cir. 1994); Lac D’Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 
1558 (D.N.J. 1985) (construing ambiguous policies in favor of policyholders such that “exposure, 
exposure in residence, and manifestation each trigger coverage under the policies”), vacated on 
other grounds, 864 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1988); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Ca. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 
P.2d 878, 906 (Cal. 1995) (en banc) (applying “continuous injury” trigger); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985) (adopting continuous trigger because policyholder “could 
have reasonably formed an expectation that it was purchasing insurance coverage for all future 
liability arising from the manufacturing and selling of [a drug with harmful side effects]”); Owens-
Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (N.J. 1994) (applying continuous trigger to 
progressive injury or damage claims); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 
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D. Allocation 
Similarly, courts’ answers to the second question—the amount of 
liability paid by each triggered policy—also has varied by jurisdiction.15  
Because long-tail claims may trigger numerous policies, some courts, 
relying upon the “all sums” language in commercial general liability 
policies that provides that the insurer agrees to pay “all sums” for which 
the policyholder is liable, have held that the policyholder can select 
which of the triggered policy years will cover the liability subject only to 
the limits of coverage provided by the policies selected.16  Other 
jurisdictions have adopted pro rata allocation, which essentially divides 
the liability equally among the policy years triggered.17  Finally, New 
                                                                                                                       
502, 507 (Pa. 1993) (concluding that the policies of each insurer that was on the risk during the 
development of an asbestosis-related disease are triggered); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Cal. Union Ins. 
Co., 419 N.W.2d 255, 258–59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the occurrence was active and 
continuing during the terms of the policies). 
 15. In “manifestation” trigger jurisdictions, the allocation issue is straightforward because only 
a single policy year is triggered by each claim.  Thus, the loss does not need to be allocated among 
multiple triggered policy years.  For a discussion of insurance allocation law generally, see Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create a Thicket of 
Potential Unfairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 807–23 (1999).  
For a discussion of allocation issues in the context of environmental-coverage cases, see Christopher 
R. Hermann et al., The Unanswered Question of Environmental Insurance Allocation in Oregon 
Law, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1131 (2003); Thomas M. Jones & Jon D. Hurwitz, An Introduction to 
Insurance Allocation Issues in Multiple-Trigger Cases, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25 (1999). 
 16. See, e.g., AC&S, 764 F.2d at 974 (“[T]here is no proration of losses under a policy once 
coverage is triggered.”); Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1050 (policyholder may “collect from any insurer 
whose coverage is triggered, the full amount of indemnity that it is due, subject only to the 
provisions in the policies that govern the allocation of liability when more than one policy covers an 
injury”); New Castle, 725 F. Supp. at 817 n.28 (finding insufficient evidence for proration); Reading 
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 87-2021, 1988 WL 13242, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1988) (holding 
each insurer jointly and severally liable for the injuries that occurred during its policy period); 
Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 491 (Del. 2001) (finding “all sums” language in policy 
to be inconsistent with pro rata allocation); Owens-Ill., 597 F. Supp. at 1524 (holding that once 
triggered, policy provided coverage without any proration); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. 
Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 770, 788 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1995) (noting that under “continuous 
injury trigger of coverage,” bodily injury occurs from the first exposure to asbestos and ends with 
diagnosis; and any policy in force may be triggered); J.H. France, 626 A.2d at 506–07 (finding each 
insurer that issued a CGL policy to manufacturer of asbestos-containing products liable for entire 
loss subject to policy limits); Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 
254 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding that all insurers on risk during time of ongoing damage have 
joint and several obligation to provide coverage of all damages, regardless of amount that occurred 
during their policy period). 
 17. See, e.g., Soc’y of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lafayette & Lake Charles, 
Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (5th Cir. 1994) (dividing liability for 
damages based on each insurer’s share of coverage); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 
765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (requiring all insurers that provided coverage to asbestos 
manufacturer during periods of exposure to participate in defense and settlement on prorated basis); 
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding 
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Jersey applies a variation of pro rata allocation that divides the liability 
among the triggered insurance policies based upon the percentage 
amount of the limits of each policy issued in relation to all of the 
insurance triggered by the claim.18 
E. Non-Cumulation Clauses 
1. The Wording of Non-Cumulation Clauses 
Adding to the complexity of the analysis are non-cumulation clauses, 
which often were included in historical liability policies.  One common 
version of the non-cumulation clause, which is used in London umbrella 
liability policies, contains the following language: 
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole 
or in part under any other excess policy issued to the Assured prior to 
the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon . . . shall be 
reduced by any amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss 
under such prior insurance.19 
In a typical liability-insurance program, many of the policies issued in 
the program may contain a non-cumulation clause with this language or 
similar language.20 
                                                                                                                       
each of manufacturer’s insurers issuing policies covering various time periods liable for its pro rata 
share); Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) 
(applying time-on-the-risk method of apportioning loss among successive insurers in remediation of 
chemical contamination claim), modified on reh’g, 594 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), 
abrogated by Griswold Props., L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 741 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2007); N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn. 1994) (en banc) 
(“Allocation of liability between multiple insurers consecutively on the risk for pollution damages 
should be proportionate to the damages which occurred during each policy period.”); Cont’l Cas. Co. 
v. Med. Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“[P]roration among the three 
companies on the basis of the proportionate period of each company’s exposure is the fairest method 
of apportioning the settlement.”). 
 18. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1124 (N.J. 1998) (allocating 
coverage among multiple liability insurers in proportion to the degree of the risks transferred or 
retained during the years of exposure); see Owens-Ill., 650 A.2d at 995 (“[W]hen progressive 
indivisible injury or damage results from exposure to injurious conditions for which civil liability 
may be imposed, courts may reasonably treat the progressive injury or damage as an occurrence 
within each of the years of a CGL policy.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Del. 
2010). 
 20. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. A-6706-01T5, A-
6720-01T5, 2004 WL 1878764, at *19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 8, 2004). 
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2. The Drafting of the London Version of the Non-Cumulation Clause 
The London market version of the non-cumulation clause was first 
drafted in 1960 by the underwriters at Lloyd’s of London in connection 
with the development of a new umbrella liability form known as the 
“LRD 60” form.21  The LRD 60 form was named after the initials of the 
principal draftsman, Leslie R. Dew, who was then the chief underwriter 
for the Merrett Syndicate at Lloyd’s of London.22  Dew was assisted in 
the drafting of the LRD 60 form by the then-senior underwriter in the 
Merrett Syndicate, Henry S. Weavers.23 
When the LRD 60 form was originally drafted in 1960, it contained 
two paragraphs worded as follows: 
C. PRIOR INSURANCE AND NON CUMULATION OF LIABILITY 
 It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in 
whole or in part under any other policy issued to the Assured prior to 
the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon as stated in item 2 
of the Declarations shall be reduced by any amounts due to the Assured 
on account of such loss under such prior policy insurance. 
 Subject to the foregoing paragraph and to all the other terms and 
conditions of this policy in the event that personal injury or property 
damage arising out of an occurrence covered hereunder is continuing at 
the time of termination of this policy Underwriters will continue to 
protect the Assured for liability in respect of such personal injury or 
property damage without payment of additional premium.24 
                                                     
 21. Transcript of Deposition of Peter Wilson at 76, E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 996 A.2d 1254 
(No. 523) [hereinafter Wilson Deposition I]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Randolph M. Fields, The Underwriting of Unlimited Risk: The London Market 
Umbrella Liability Policy 1950 to 1970, Morgan Owen Medal Essay Submission to the Chartered 
Insurance Institute (1994) (Exhibit 16) (LRD 60 Form Policy, Condition C). 
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According to at least one London underwriter, the drafters included 
the non-cumulation clause in the new LRD 60 policy form to prevent a 
policyholder from obtaining a double recovery on a coverage claim only 
in the limited circumstance that the policy using the LRD 60 form 
covered the claim and a prior-incepting policy using a different form also 
covered the same claim.25  The reason for this was that the LRD 60 form, 
which was an “occurrence”-based form, significantly changed the 
standard “accident”-based Price Forbes umbrella liability form that 
previously had been used by insurers in the London market.26  For 
example, in a situation in which an insured manufactured defective 
machinery in 1958 that resulted in an injury in 1961, a claim could 
trigger both a Price Forbes form policy issued in 1958—when the 
“accident” of the defective manufacture arguably took place—and a 
1961 policy using the LRD 60 form—when the injury arguably 
“occurred.”  The drafters designed the non-cumulation clause to thwart 
the policyholder’s attempt at obtaining twice as much coverage as the 
amount of the liability by pursuing coverage under both policies for the 
same liability.27 
Significantly, at the time the non-cumulation clause was drafted in 
1960, the drafters did not contemplate the later developments in 
insurance law that occurred in the United States.28  Specifically, concepts 
such as continuous trigger, in which a single claim can trigger multiple, 
consecutive policies, and “all sums” allocations, which allows the 
policyholder to “pick and choose” which policy year would provide 
coverage for the liability, were unknown and undeveloped in 1960.29  
Thus, the drafters did not design or intend the non-cumulation clause to 
apply in the modern-day coverage schemes of continuous trigger and “all 
sums” coverage responsibility that now exists under state law in 
jurisdictions such as California,30 Delaware,31 Illinois,32 Indiana,33 
                                                     
 25. See Wilson Deposition I, supra note 21, at 76–81; Transcript of Deposition of Peter Wilson 
at 65–72 (Sept. 29, 1998), Interlake Corp. v. Certain Underwriters Lloyd’s London, No. 2-97-0277 
(Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Wilson Deposition II]; see also Fields, supra note 24, at 34. 
 26. See Wilson Deposition I, supra note 21, at 76–81. 
 27. Id. at 158.  See also Wilson Deposition II, supra note 25, at 65–72. 
 28. Wilson Deposition I, supra note 21, at 98–100. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 919–20 & n.10 (Cal. 
1997). 
 31. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 489–92 (Del. 2001). 
 32. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150, 161, 165 (Ill. 1987). 
 33. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1060, 1063 (Ind. 2001). 
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Massachusetts,34 Ohio,35 Pennsylvania,36 Texas,37 Washington,38 and 
Wisconsin.39  Rather, the drafters designed and intended the clause to 
prevent a policyholder from obtaining a double recovery in very narrow 
circumstances. 
From 1960 until 1970, insurers in the London market used the non-
cumulation clause in umbrella primary and excess liability policies 
issued to North American policyholders.40  In 1971, insurers in the 
London market modified the LRD 60 policy form for use in North 
America, and they designated the modified policy form as the “Umbrella 
Policy London 1971” form, or the “London ‘71 umbrella form.”41  The 
London ‘71 umbrella form was prepared by three underwriters in the 
London market: Peter Wilson, Cliff Richies, and John Byrd.42 
The London ‘71 umbrella form incorporated the first paragraph of 
the non-cumulation clause in the LRD 60 form.43  The London ‘71 
umbrella form omitted the second paragraph of the non-cumulation 
clause from the LRD 60 form because the drafters believed the second 
paragraph to be redundant of other language in the policy.44  Since 1971, 
London market insurers have issued countless policies using the London 
‘71 umbrella form for North American excess liability policies. 
As admitted by one of the drafters of the London ‘71 umbrella form, 
the “all sums” allocation scheme—under which the policyholder gets to 
select the policy year or years that will provide coverage among multiple 
consecutive policy years that are all liable for a loss—still had not been 
adopted in 1971 when the non-cumulation clause was modified for the 
London ‘71 umbrella form.45  Thus, as was the case with the LRD 60 
version of the non-cumulation clause, the drafters of the 1971 version 
                                                     
 34. See, e.g., Mass. Elec. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. 9900467B, 2005 WL 
3489874, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2005). 
 35. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.2d 835, 840 
(Ohio 2002). 
 36. See, e.g., J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 505 (Pa. 1993). 
 37. See, e.g., Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 853–54 (Tex. 1994). 
 38. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 256–57 
(Wash. 1998) (en banc). 
 39. See, e.g., Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759 N.W.2d 613, 625–26 (Wis. 2009). 
 40. See Wilson Deposition I, supra note 21, at 78 (stating that the LRD 60 form was introduced 
for umbrella business in May of 1960). 
 41. See id. at 64, 85, 87–88. 
 42. Id. at 64. 
 43. Id. at 84–85. 
 44. Id. at 85–86. 
 45. See id. at 98–100. 
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also did not intend for the non-cumulation clause to apply in “all sums” 
allocation jurisdictions. 
The non-cumulation clause, as originally drafted in 1960 by insurers 
in the London market for the LRD 60 form and then modified in the 
London ‘71 umbrella form, was used for many years in London umbrella 
liability policies that were sold to U.S. companies.46  Many U.S. insurers 
also issued liability policies in excess of London umbrella policies that 
“followed-form”—that is, incorporated by reference the policy language 
of London umbrella liability policies—or issued policies with their own 
versions of a non-cumulation clause. 
III. THE COURTS’ INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
OF NON-CUMULATION CLAUSES 
In jurisdictions where the courts have interpreted non-cumulation 
clauses, numerous courts have rejected interpretations of such clauses 
that would reduce or eliminate the policyholder’s recovery.47  Yet, the 
                                                     
 46. Id. at 87–88. 
 47. See, e.g., Spartan Iron & Metal Corp. v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 6 Fed. App’x 176, 179 (4th Cir. 
2001) (finding non-cumulation clause ambiguous and construing it against the insurer); Greene, 
Tweed & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 03-3637, 2006 WL 1050110, at 
*16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006) (holding non-cumulation clause to be an invalid and “unenforceable 
escape clause” because it would have totally abrogated coverage for the policyholder); Glaser v. 
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 529, 538 (D. Md. 2005) (finding ambiguities in the policies 
and resolving them against the insurer); UTI Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 362, 
378 (D.N.J. 1995) (invalidating non-cumulation clause as an unenforceable escape clause, stating 
that “it is ‘unacceptable for an insurance company to provide no coverage under a policy for which it 
received premiums’” (quoting Auto. Underwriters, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 188, 
191 (3d Cir. 1989))); A.B.S. Clothing Collection, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 171–
73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that non-cumulation clause is ambiguous); Varian Assocs., Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 944196, at 30–31 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1997), in 11-11 MEALEY’S LITIG. 
REP.: INS. (Jan. 21, 1997) (refusing to enforce a non-cumulation clause that purports “to reduce or 
eliminate the limits of liability of a policy because of the existence of other insurance covering the 
same loss” as a disfavored “escape clause”); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Emp’rs Ins. of 
Wausau, No. 847212, 1995 WL 870851, at *21 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995) (disfavoring application of 
“prior insurance” clauses that result in no coverage for a loss that the insured reasonably assumed 
would be covered); In re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination 
Proceeding No. 1072, at 30–32 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1988), in 2:21 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS. 
(Sept. 14, 1988) (declining to apply a non-cumulation provision because it was (1) ambiguous; (2) 
merely another form of “other insurance” clause; and (3) difficult if not impossible to apply in the 
context of thousands of asbestos-related bodily injury claims); Shemitz Lighting, Inc. v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., No. CV960052970, 2000 WL 1781840, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2000) (finding 
the policy terms ambiguous and construing them against the insurer); Sherman & Hemstreet, Inc. v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Ga. 2004) (finding the non-cumulation clause ambiguous 
and construing the ambiguity in favor of the insured); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that “appl[ication of] the ‘prior insurance’ and 
‘non cumulation of liability’ clauses would give the insurers a double credit and would deprive the 
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courts’ reasoning and rationales for doing so have varied widely in these 
jurisdictions. 
A. Courts in Pro Rata Jurisdictions 
In pro rata jurisdictions, some courts have held that the application of 
non-cumulation clauses, as requested by certain insurers, would conflict 
with pro rata allocation.48  In short, these courts have reasoned that the 
insurer’s liability already has been reduced because the insurer is only 
being required to pay a portion of the policyholder’s loss.49  Thus, it 
would be inconsistent with such an allocation scheme to further reduce 
the insurer’s liability by giving the insurer an additional “credit” for 
amounts paid by other insurers.50 
B. Courts in “All Sums” Jurisdictions 
Similarly, numerous courts in “all sums” jurisdictions have held that 
a non-cumulation clause should not be construed in a way that eliminates 
or reduces the policyholder’s recovery, but, as discussed below, their 
reasons for doing so have varied.51 
 
                                                                                                                       
insured of the full value of its premium” and would be inequitable “because no excess insurer is 
concurrently liable with any other”); Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 819 A.2d 
410, 422 (N.J. 2003) (“Once the court turns to pro rata allocation, it makes sense that the non-
cumulation clause, which would allow the insurer to avoid its fair share of responsibility, drops out 
of the policy.”); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. A-6706-01T5, A-6720-
03T5, 2004 WL 1878764, at *21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 8, 2004) (per curiam) (holding non-
cumulation clauses to be inapplicable because the amounts do not become due until the insured 
selects the policy year to indemnify it). 
 48. See Emp’rs Ins. Wausau, 1995 WL 870851, at *21–22 (adopting pro rata allocation and 
finding that competing other insurance and prior insurance clauses must be resolved in accordance 
with the terms of the policies); Outboard Marine, 670 N.E.2d at 750 (finding that application of non-
cumulation clause “would be inequitable because no excess insurer is concurrently liable with any 
other”); Spaulding, 819 A.2d at 422 (“Once the court turns to pro rata allocation it makes sense that 
the non-cumulation clause, which would allow the insurer to avoid its fair share of responsibility, 
drops out of the policy.”). 
 49. See cases cited supra note 48. 
 50. See cases cited supra note 48. 
 51. See, e.g., Greene, 2006 WL 1050110 at *13–16; UTI Corp., 896 F. Supp. at 378; In re 
Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, No. 1072, at 30–32; Varian, No. 94416, at 30–31. 
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1. There Are No Amounts “Due” Under Prior Policies if the 
Policyholder Does Not Pursue Coverage Under the Prior Policies 
Some insurers premise their arguments regarding the application of 
non-cumulation clauses on the notion that if a policyholder’s liabilities 
span multiple policy periods, then there must be an “amount due” under 
prior insurance.52  This premise is fundamentally incorrect in an “all 
sums” jurisdiction where the policyholder has selected a single policy 
year to provide coverage for the liability.  Under an ordinary dictionary 
definition, the word “due” means the amount “owed or owing as a 
debt.”53  There is no amount “owed” to the policyholder by prior 
insurance when the policyholder does not present a claim to the prior 
insurers.  Indeed, in “all sums” jurisdictions, the policyholder may 
choose the policy year for which the insurer is obligated to pay—and 
thus “owe”—to the policyholder the full amount of the loss subject to 
policy limits in the chosen policy year.  The policyholder has this right 
even if the policyholder also could have sought to recover the same 
amount from insurers in other policy years. 
The decision in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. American Home 
Assurance Co. is particularly instructive on this issue.  In Westinghouse, 
in applying Pennsylvania’s “all sums” allocation rule, the court held that 
a non-cumulation clause was inapplicable to bodily injury claims that 
spanned multiple policy periods because the policyholder elected to 
recover for its losses under only one policy year.54  Therefore, the court 
concluded, “there are no ‘amounts due’ under any prior issued excess 
policies.”55  Critical to the court’s holding were the facts that (1) under 
“all sums” allocation, the policyholder’s coverage is “spiked” in a single 
year and (2) although other “policies are theoretically liable, the amounts 
do not become due until the insured selects the policy year to indemnify 
it.”56  Thus, because the policyholder in Westinghouse selected a single 
policy year to provide coverage, the non-cumulation clause did not 
apply. 
 
                                                     
 52. See Westinghouse, 2004 WL 1878764, at *11. 
 53. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 357 (10th ed. 1997). 
 54. Westinghouse, 2004 WL 1878764, at *21. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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2. Application of the Non-Cumulation Clause as Requested by Insurers 
Would Allow the Insurers to “Escape” Liability 
Some courts have found non-cumulation clauses to be unenforceable 
because, as interpreted by the insurers, they were similar to “other 
insurance” clauses that allowed the insurers to “escape” liability for a 
loss to the detriment of the policyholders.57  Where all triggered policies 
in all triggered years have provisions which purport to deflect coverage 
responsibility to another year, courts have concluded that these 
provisions cancel out each other.58  Thus, such courts have not allowed 
the clauses to defeat recovery by the policyholder.59 
As recognized by courts in “all sums” jurisdictions, the ability of the 
policyholder to select which policy year initially will respond to the loss 
would be illusory if clauses in those policies that purport to shift liability 
to another insurer were permitted to operate to the detriment of the 
policyholder.60 
                                                     
 57. See cases cited supra note 48. 
 58. See, e.g., Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Pike, 977 F.2d 1278, 1279–80 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that both insurers’ escape clauses “are mutually repugnant and both policies will share 
pro rata liability”); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. United Int’l Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 1470, 1474 (M.D. 
Ala. 1990) (finding two policies with excess insurance clauses mutually repugnant because two 
policies cannot be excess to each other); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 140, 
143 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that conflicting excess clauses cancel each other out and prorating 
each insurer’s liability according to the policy limit); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 210 So. 2d 688, 694–95 (Ala. 1968) (per curiam) (finding that “excess insurance” clauses 
were mutually repugnant and prorating the payout by policy limits); Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1199 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (voiding mutually repugnant “other 
insurance” clauses); Buckson v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., C.A. No. 97C-04-009, 1999 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 301, at *13–16 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 1999) (finding competing policies’ “other 
insurance” provisions to be “mutually repugnant” and prorating loss based on policy limits); Celina 
Mut. Cas. Co. of Ohio v. Citizens Cas. Co. of N.Y., 71 A.2d 20, 22 (Md. Ct. App. 1950) (“The 
general rule as to insurance policies is that where there are pro rata or proportionate clauses in 
several insurance policies insuring the same property, the insurance is concurrent and each insurer is 
liable for its proportionate amount.”); Rogers v. Snappy Car Rental Inc., 639 A.2d 1154, 1160 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (finding clauses in both policies are mutually repugnant); Lamb-Weston, 
Inc. v. Or. Auto. Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 110, 119 (Or. 1959) (finding that where any policy comes in 
conflict with the “other insurance” clause of another insurer, they are repugnant and should be 
rejected “in toto”). 
 59. See cases cited supra note 58. 
 60. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding 
that under “all sums” allocation, an “other insurance” clause does not prohibit the policyholder from 
selecting the policy to respond, but rather permits an insurer to seek contribution from other 
insurers); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that 
“other insurance” does not diminish the primary duty of the insurer whose coverage is triggered to 
indemnify the policyholder in full); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 927–
33 (Cal. 1997) (holding that “other insurance” clauses were without effect under “all sums” scheme); 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 770, 794–95 (Ohio Ct. 
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C. Some Courts Have Applied Non-Cumulation Clauses to Reduce, but 
Not Eliminate, the Insurer’s Payment Obligations 
Some courts have applied non-cumulation clauses to reduce policy 
limits where the long-tail liabilities were covered under multiple policy 
years.61  Such courts typically have done so where a single insurer issues 
policies in multiple years, and the court determines that the insurer 
should not have to pay for the same loss multiple times.62  For example, 
in Treesdale, the non-cumulation clause at issue read as follows: 
If the same occurrence gives rise to personal injury, property damage or 
advertising injury or damage which occurs partly before and partly 
within any annual period of this policy, each occurrence limit and the 
applicable aggregate limit or limits of the policy shall be reduced by 
the amount of each payment made by the company with respect to each 
occurrence, either under a previous policy or policies of which this 
policy is a replacement, or under this policy with respect to previous 
                                                                                                                       
Com. Pl. 1995) (holding that an insurer in an “all sums” scheme must provide coverage for the 
insured’s entire liability notwithstanding an “other insurance” provision); J.H. France Refractories 
Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508–09 (Pa. 1993) (finding that the “other insurance” 
provision at issue allowed the insurer to seek indemnification from other insurers but did not reduce 
amount owed to insured under the “all sum” scheme). 
 61. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 339–45 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(noting that a non-cumulation clause does not eliminate coverage, but “provides that if a single 
occurrence gives rise to an injury during more tha[n] one policy period, only one occurrence limit 
will apply”); Plantation Pipeline Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 1:03-CV-2811-WBH, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 80680, at *9–13 (N.D. Ga. July 8, 2008) (enforcing non-cumulation clause); Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Black & Decker Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 200, 216 (D. Mass. 2004) (dictum) (noting that 
the non-cumulation clause “appears unambiguous and enforceable, and eminently sensible besides”); 
Cal. Ins. Co. v. Stimson Lumber Co., No. 01-514-HA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10098, at *32 (D. Or. 
May 26, 2004) (concluding that the non-cumulation provision applies to reduce the insurer’s policy 
limits by the amounts paid in prior policy years or the amounts paid by other excess settling insurers 
where there is any excess insurance coverage available), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 325 F. App’x 
496 (9th Cir. 2009); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 176, 181–82 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the non-cumulation clause prevented the insured from recovering 
more than one policy limit after invoking coverage under several policies); O-I Brockway Glass 
Container, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 90-2797(AET), 1994 WL 910935, at *3 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 10, 1994) (stating that “[t]he Non-Cumulation Clause in both content and title clearly states that 
the insured shall not recover more than the per occurrence limit by invoking coverage under several 
policies”); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., CIV.A. No. 86-7501, 1989 
WL 73656, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1989) (holding that the non-cumulation clause allowed the 
insurer was entitled to reduce the policy’s limits by the amount of payment under earlier policy), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 25 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1994); Viking Pump, Inc. v. 
Century Indem. Co., No. 1465-VCS, 2009 WL 3297559, at *28–29 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2009) (finding 
that the prior insurance clause prevents a policyholder from obtaining more than one year’s set of 
per-occurrence limits for a given occurrence); Hiraldo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 840 N.E.2d 563, 564 
(N.Y. 2005) (noting that the non-cumulation clause resulted in the “intuitive[e]” outcome that an 
insurer’s total liability for a single loss is reduced to one limit). 
 62. See, e.g., Air Prods., 1989 WL 73656, at *1. 
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annual periods thereof.63 
The policyholder did not contend the clause was ambiguous.64  
Consequently, in applying the clause, the court decided that the insurer  
should only be required to pay for the loss under one of the policies it 
issued.65 
Courts have shown a greater willingness to interpret the version of 
the non-cumulation clause at issue in the Treesdale case to the detriment 
of the policyholder because, in several ways, the language at issue in that 
case was narrowly tailored and had a much smaller scope than the typical 
non-cumulation clause language.  Moreover, the non-cumulation clause 
language in Treesdale was clearly triggered by prior payment rather than 
by the amorphous phrase “any amounts due to the Assured” found in the 
London market version of the non-cumulation clause language.66 
Further, rather than purporting to effectuate an automatic reduction 
in policy limits whenever any prior excess policy of any other insurer 
may owe obligations to the policyholder—as some insurers contend the 
clause should operate67—the language found in such cases only reduced 
a policy’s limits when the “company,” that is, the same insurer, made 
payments under one of its own prior policies.68  Thus, the non-
cumulation clause at issue in cases such as Treesdale does not purport to 
change the insurer’s coverage obligations by virtue of another insurer’s 
liability. 
Tellingly, nearly all of the judicial decisions relied upon by insurers 
to support their coverage-reducing or coverage-eliminating interpretation 
of non-cumulation clauses contain policy language similar to, if not 
                                                     
 63. Treesdale, 418 F.3d at 339 (emphasis added); see also Greene, Tweed & Co. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 03-3637, 2006 WL 1050110, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 
2006) (distinguishing Treesdale because it dealt with a clause “that appear[ed] in multiple policies 
issued by the same insurer that cover[ed] the same loss”). 
 64. Treesdale, 418 F.3d at 344. 
 65. Id. at 345. 
 66. Compare id. at 339 (“[The] limits of the policy shall be reduced by the amount of each 
payment . . . .”  (emphasis added)), with Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 
A.2d 1254, 1259 (Del. 2010) (“[The policy limits] shall be reduced by any amounts due to the 
Assured on account of such loss under such prior insurance.”  (emphasis added)); see supra Part 
II.E.2. 
 67. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 996 A.2d at 1259 (describing insurer’s contention that the 
non-cumulation clause unambiguously operated to reduce insurer’s liability). 
 68. See, e.g., Treesdale, 418 F.3d at 339 (“[The] limits of the policy shall be reduced by the 
amount of each payment made by the company . . . either under a previous policy or policies of 
which this policy is a replacement . . . .”  (emphasis added)). 
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exactly the same as, that at issue in the Treesdale case.69  Further, all of 
these cases involved one insurer that had issued successive policies that 
contained the same non-cumulation clause.70 
Essentially, these courts have held that the non-cumulation clauses 
were “valid so long as the insurer invoking the provision will be required 
to indemnify the insured pursuant to either the policy containing the 
provision or under other policies it issued to the insured.”71  Indeed, in 
such decisions, the insurer in whose favor a non-cumulation clause was 
interpreted had paid the policyholder the full limits of at least one of its 
policies.72 
IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION 
RELEVANT TO THE INTERPRETATION OF NON-CUMULATION 
CLAUSES 
When courts interpret and apply policy language such as non-
cumulation clauses, three well-established rules of policy interpretation 
emerge as particularly relevant to the analysis: (1) the doctrine of contra 
proferentem, (2) the doctrine of “reasonable expectations,” and (3) the 
construction of the policy as a whole. 
                                                     
 69. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Black & Decker Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 200, 216 (D. 
Mass. 2004); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 176, 179–80 (N.D.N.Y. 
1996); O-I Brockway Glass Container, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 90-2797(AET), 1994 
WL 910935, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 1994); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co., CIV.A. No. 86-7501, 1989 WL 73656, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1989).  See also Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Treasure Coast Travel Agency, Inc., 660 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(involving multiple, successive policies issued by the same insurer, all of which included a non-
cumulation clause that provided “[r]egardless of the number of years this insurance remains in 
force . . . no Limit of Insurance cumulates from year to year or period to period”); Hiraldo ex rel. 
Hiraldo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 840 N.E.2d 563, 564 (N.Y. 2005) (involving multiple, successive 
policies issued by the same insurer, all of which included a non-cumulation clause that provided 
“[r]egardless of the number of . . . policies involved, our total liability . . . for damages resulting 
from one loss will not exceed the limit of liability for Coverage X shown on the declarations page”); 
Mark IV Indus., Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., No. 2005/2029, 2006 WL 1458245, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2006) (involving multiple, successive policies issued by the same insurer, all of 
which included a non-cumulation clause that provided “[i]f one occurrence causes bodily injury, 
personal injury and/or property damage during this policy period AND during the policy period of 
one or more prior and/or future policy(ies) . . . issued to you by us, then this policy’s Each 
Occurrence Limit will be reduced by the amount of each payment made by us”). 
 70. See cases cited supra note 69. 
 71. Greene, Tweed & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 03-3637, 2006 
WL 1050110, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006). 
 72. See, e.g., id. at *1. 
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A. The Doctrine of Contra Proferentem 
It is hornbook insurance law that because insurers are the drafters of 
policy language such as non-cumulation clauses, the doctrine of contra 
proferentem73 applies, which means any ambiguities in the policy  
language should be construed against the insurers and in favor of 
coverage.74  The test under many states’ laws for determining whether 
                                                     
 73. For a discussion of insurance policy interpretation and the doctrine of contra proferentem, 
see generally Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
531 (1996) and David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form 
Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431 (2009) (detailing the history of contra proferentem and claiming 
a decline in strict application of the doctrine). 
 74. See, e.g., 13 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, 
§§ 7401, 7481 (1976 & Supp. 1995); 1 ARTHUR N. BROOK ET AL., BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE GUIDE § 2.02[1] (1992); 4 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
§§ 16.04, 16.06 (1999); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.03[b][1] (3d ed. 1990); 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 22:14 (3d. ed. 1997); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS §§ 5.1, 5.2 (1994); David B. Goodwin, Disputing Insurance Coverage Disputes, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 779, 795 (1991).  Much case law recognizes and applies contra proferentem.  See, 
e.g., New Castle Cnty., Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 243 F.3d 744, 750 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (“When policy language is ambiguous . . . under Delaware law this Court must apply the 
doctrine of contra proferentem.”); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 538–39 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (“According to the law of California and, indeed, every other state as well as the District 
of Columbia, ambiguities in insurance contracts must be construed against the insurer.”  (footnotes 
omitted)); Keller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 877 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark. 1994) (“If there is a reasonable 
construction that may be given to the contract that would justify recovery, it is the duty of the court 
to adopt it.”); Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) 
(“Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer.”); Hecla 
Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1091–92 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (finding the term 
“sudden” to be ambiguous and construing the phrase “sudden and accidental” against the insurer to 
mean unexpected and unintended); Cody v. Remington Elec. Shavers, 427 A.2d 810, 812 (Conn. 
1980) (stating that ambiguities in contract documents are to be resolved against the party responsible 
for its drafting); Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129–30 (Del. 
1997) (en banc) (“If there is an ambiguity, however, the contract language is ‘construed most 
strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.’”  (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. 
v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992))); Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1989) (“Since an insurer prepares its own contracts, it has a duty to 
make the meaning clear, and if it fails to do so, the insurer, and not the insured, must suffer.”  
(quoting Fowler v. United Equitable Ins. Co. 438 P.2d 46, 48 (Kan. 1968))); RPM Pizza, Inc. v. 
Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity must be construed against 
the insurance company and in favor of the reasonable construction that affords coverage.”); Me. 
Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 665 A.2d 671, 673 (Me. 1995) (“A liability insurance 
policy must be construed to resolve all ambiguities in favor of coverage.”); Am. Bumper & Mfg. Co. 
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich. 1996) (“[I]n construing insurance contracts, 
any ambiguities are strictly construed against the insurer to maximize coverage.”); DeBerry v. Am. 
Motorists Ins. Co., 236 S.E.2d 380, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (“[A]ny ambiguity or uncertainty as to 
the meaning of terms in a policy should be resolved against the insurer since it selected the language 
used.”); Kief Farmers Coop Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 32 (N.D. 1995) 
(noting that courts should “balance the equities in favor of providing coverage to the insured” when 
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policy language is ambiguous is whether the provisions at issue are 
reasonably or fairly susceptible to different interpretations or meanings.75  
                                                                                                                       
construing ambiguous policy language); Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 674 A.2d 975, 977 (N.H. 
1996) (“If the policy language is ambiguous or where conflicting interpretations exist, [the court 
will] construe the [insurance] policy in favor of providing coverage to insured.”); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 226 (N.J. 1965) (“‘If the controlling language will support two meanings, 
one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to the insured, the interpretation sustaining 
coverage must be applied.’”  (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 170 A.2d 
800, 803 (N.J. 1961))); New York v. Home Indem. Co., 486 N.E.2d 827, 829 (N.Y. 1985) (“If . . . 
the language in the insurance contract is ambiguous and susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, the parties may submit extrinsic evidence as an aid in construction, and the resolution 
of the ambiguity is for the trier of fact.”); Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1347, 
1348–49 (Ohio 1982) (“Policies of insurance, which are in language selected by the insurer and 
which are reasonably open to different interpretations, will be construed most favorably for the 
insured.”); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The very existence 
of two contrary schools of thought evidenced by the conflicting holdings in cases cited by both the 
Appellee and the Appellant is convincing in the conclusion that the clause in issue is ambiguous as 
to whether coverage is to be afforded under the fact situation presented. Such ambiguity, by itself, 
requires that we resolve the issue in favor of the Appellee, the insured driver.”); Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991) (“[I]f a contract 
of insurance is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we must resolve the 
uncertainty by adopting the construction that most favors the insured.”); Garneau v. Curtis & Bedell, 
Inc., 610 A.2d 132, 134 (Vt. 1992) (“In determining whether the insurer has a duty to indemnify, any 
ambiguity in the insurance contract will be resolved in favor of the insured.”); Murray v. W. Pac. 
Ins. Co., 472 P.2d 611, 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (“[E]xclusionary clauses in insurance policies are 
construed most strongly against the insurer.”). 
 75. 13 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 74, § 7403 (noting that the insurer has the burden 
of establishing that insurer’s interpretation is the only fair interpretation of the contract); 4 LONG, 
supra note 74, § 16.06.  Ample case law supports this rule.  See, e.g., New Castle, 243 F.3d at 750 
(“‘The settled test for ambiguity is whether the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly 
susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.’”  (quoting New 
Castle Cnty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 338, 342–44 (3d Cir. 1999))); W. Heritage Ins. 
Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs. & Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
Texas law enforces policy as written if it can be given only one reasonable construction); Vargas v. 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that the insurer bears the heavy burden 
of proving the policyholder’s interpretation is unreasonable and the insurer’s interpretation is the 
only one that could fairly be placed on the policy); Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 
280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that policy language is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or 
more meanings); Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 130 (Del. 1997) 
(en banc) (“‘Convoluted or confusing terms are the problem of the insurer . . . not the insured.’”  
(quoting Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Del. 1997))); High Country 
Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 476 (N.H. 1994) (“If the language of the policy reasonably 
may be interpreted more than one way and one interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in 
the policy that will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”); Salem Grp. v. 
Oliver, 607 A.2d 138, 139 (N.J. 1992) (per curiam) (“When a policy fairly supports an interpretation 
favorable to both the insured and the insurer, the policy should be interpreted in favor of the 
insured.”); Harris, Jolliff & Michel, Inc. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.E.2d 302, 305–07 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1970) (finding that where insurer and insured each presented reasonable interpretations of 
exclusion, exclusion is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured); Bartlett v. Amica 
Mut. Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 45, 47 (R.I. 1991) (noting that a contract will be strictly construed in favor 
of the insured when the language is ambiguous or capable of more than one reasonable meaning); 
Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (“The court must 
adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as that construction is 
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Where the controversy involves a phrase that insurance companies have 
failed to define and has generated many lawsuits with varying results, 
common sense dictates that the policy language must be ambiguous.76 
As discussed above, an ambiguous insurance policy provision is one 
that has more than one reasonable meaning.  When one attempts to apply 
non-cumulation clauses to long-tail liability claims, it becomes apparent 
that the language in many non-cumulation clauses is riddled with 
ambiguities and unanswered questions regarding how it should apply. 
To focus the discussion, consider again the language of the London 
version of the non-cumulation clause: 
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole 
or in part under any other excess policy issued to the Assured prior to 
the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon . . . shall be  
 
reduced by any amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss 
under such prior insurance.77 
                                                                                                                       
not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a 
more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”). 
 76. See, e.g., New Castle Cnty., 243 F.3d at 755–56 (finding ambiguity where the contested 
phrase was not defined and had been interpreted differently by various courts); Sec. Ins. Co. of 
Hartford v. Investors Diversified Ltd., 407 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The 
insurance company contends that the language is not ambiguous, but we cannot agree and offer as 
proof of that pudding the fact that the Supreme Court of California and the Fifth Circuit in New 
Orleans have arrived at opposite conclusions from a study of essentially the same language.”); 
Crawford, 783 P.2d at 908 (“[T]he reported cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the Court of 
Appeals reached different conclusions and the justices of this court do not agree on the proper 
interpretation.  Under such circumstances, the clause is, by definition, ambiguous and must be 
interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 311 
S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we assume that all courts adopt a reasonable 
construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that the word as so used is susceptible of at least two 
reasonable interpretations, one of which extends the coverage to the situation at hand.”); George H. 
Olmsted & Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 161 N.E. 276, 277–78 (Ohio 1928) (“[T]he fact that [other 
jurisdictions have reached conflicting interpretations], coupled with the fact that the lower courts in 
the instant case are in disagreement . . . , presents [a] persuasive argument of the ambiguity of the 
clause . . . .”); Cohen, 432 A.2d at 599 (“The mere fact that [courts differ on the construction of the 
provision] itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the provision in issue is susceptible to more 
than one interpretation.”).  See also 1 BROOK ET AL., supra note 74, §§ 2.02[1], 5.8; 4 LONG, supra 
note 74, § 16.06; Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Division of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court 
or Among Other Courts or Jurisdictions Considering Same Question, as Evidence that Particular 
Clause of Insurance Policy is Ambiguous, 4 A.L.R.4th 1253 (1981). 
 77. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Del. 2010). 
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Even the basic part of the clause—“if any loss covered hereunder is also 
covered in whole or in part under any other excess policy issued to the 
Assured prior to the inception date hereof”78—is unclear.  How does one 
determine if a loss is “covered” under a prior-incepting policy?  Must 
there be a court judgment stating as such?  Though it is unlikely to 
happen, must there be an admission of coverage by the prior insurers?  
Need there be only an assertion of the prior insurer’s coverage 
responsibility by the subsequent insurer?  In long-tail liability cases in 
“all sums” jurisdictions, the liabilities are covered by the policies in 
whatever year the policyholder has selected to cover them.79  
Necessarily, therefore, these same liabilities are not “covered” by 
policies in prior years because the policyholder has not selected those 
prior policy years for coverage.  Thus, the liabilities are not covered by 
both the policies in the selected year and the policies in the prior years. 
Moreover, the clause states that “the limit of liability hereon . . . shall 
be reduced by any amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss 
under such prior insurance.”80  What constitutes an amount “due” under 
prior insurance?  Is it an amount that a court adjudged was due?  Is it an 
amount that the subsequent insurer alleges is due from the prior-year 
insurer?  Is it an amount that the prior insurer acknowledges is due?  Is it 
an amount actually paid by a prior insurer on the same loss?  Again, 
given that the policyholder can choose the policy year that should cover 
its liabilities in an “all sums” jurisdiction,81 an insurer’s contention that 
the same amounts are “due” under prior policies makes no sense. 
What about due process?  If one were to accept the insurer’s 
argument, it very well could be determined that amounts are due from 
prior-incepting policies even though the insurers that issued the policies 
are not even parties to the case.  Such a result arguably would not even 
be enforceable against the insurers that issued prior-incepting policies  
 
                                                     
 78. Id. (emphasis added). 
 79. See supra Part III.B. 
 80. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 996 A.2d at 1259 (emphasis added). 
 81. See supra Part III.B. 
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under the well-established rule of law that a judgment cannot be entered 
against a party that was not a party in the case.82 
What happens if the policyholder has settled with prior insurers even 
though the settling insurers denied any obligation to pay for the liabilities 
and continued to deny such liability in the settlement agreements 
themselves?  Surely, the payments made by such insurers cannot be 
viewed as having been due when the settling insurers continue to contend 
they owed nothing but settled for business reasons. 
Additionally, what does it mean that the limits are “reduced”?  For 
example, are the limits of the policy reduced for just the loss at issue but 
then reinstated for the next loss?  Or are the limits reduced for all future 
losses as well? 
In E.I. du Pont de Nemours,83 for example, one of the insurer’s 
experts contended the limits of the policy were reduced for just the 
liability at issue, but another expert of the insurer contended the limits 
were forever reduced for all future liabilities and for all types of claims.84  
Thus, in the second expert’s opinion, because amounts were due under 
prior policies issued by other insurers, the insurer’s policy at issue was 
relieved of all coverage obligations for all types of claims even though 
the insurer had never paid a dime under the policy for any type of 
claim.85  Such an outcome would be incredible and completely 
inconsistent with insurance law.  Moreover, if an insurer’s own “experts” 
do not agree on how the policy should work, how can the insurer 
credibly argue the policy language is unambiguous? 
                                                     
 82. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (“‘[O]ne is not bound by a judgment 
in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made 
a party by service of process.’”  (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940))); Martin v. 
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (“A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues 
as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.”), superseded 
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-106, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77, as 
recognized in Landsgraf v. USI Film Prods. 511 U.S. 244 (1994); EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 
383 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Circuit’s preclusion standards reflect the longstanding 
and deep-rooted principle of American law that a party cannot be bound by a judgment in a prior suit 
in which it was neither a party nor in privity with a party.”); Mason v. Genisco Tech. Corp., 960 
F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A person is not bound by a judgment in a litigation to which he or 
she has not been made a party by service of process.”); Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. 
Shavers, 562 F.2d 141, 143–44 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is the general rule that no one can be bound by a 
judgment in litigation in which he or his privy was not a party.”). 
 83. 996 A.2d at 1259. 
 84. See Wilson Deposition I, supra note 21, at 27–28. 
 85. See id. at 28. 
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Another unanswered question is how does the “reduction of limits” 
language apply when multiple policies in the same policy year all contain 
the same non-cumulation clause?  Which policies in that year receive the 
benefit of the reduction of limits, and which ones do not?  For example, 
in the E.I. du Pont de Nemours case, the insurer argued that the lowest 
four layers of coverage in its policy year should have their limits reduced 
down to zero, but the two highest layers of coverage in that year must 
cover the policyholder’s claim.86  Where is it written in the clause, or 
elsewhere, that the lowest layers of coverage should have their limits 
reduced, but the higher layers should not?  Indeed, such a result would be 
in conflict with language typically found in excess policies that requires 
exhaustion of the lower-layer policies before triggering the higher-layer 
policies.87 
The foregoing are just a few of the many questions regarding the 
ambiguities and the possible different meanings of the words used in 
non-cumulation clauses, such as the London version, and the alternative 
applications in long-tail liability cases to which the clauses were never 
intended to apply.  Indeed, the ambiguity in non-cumulation clauses as 
applied to long-tail liability claims is highlighted by the fact that the 
insurers themselves proffer different meanings, applications, and 
interpretations of such clauses and cannot agree on what the language in 
the clauses means or how the clauses apply.88  For example, in In re 
                                                     
 86. 996 A.2d at 1259–60. 
 87. See, e.g., 15 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 220:32 (3d ed. 
1999) (“The purpose of . . . excess . . . coverage is to protect the insured in the event of a 
catastrophic loss in which liability exceeds the available primary coverage.  Accordingly, it is only 
after the underlying primary policy has been exhausted does the excess . . . coverage kick in.”  
(footnote omitted)); Marcy Louise Kahn, The “Other Insurance” Clause, 19 FORUM 591, 604 
(1984) (“[W]hen a loss exceeds the amount of a primary policy[, it] triggers coverage under an 
excess policy . . . .”).  Courts have widely recognized this function of excess coverage.  See, e.g., 
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co., 514 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Excess 
liability policies, by contrast, do not provide first-dollar coverage for insured losses, but instead 
provide an additional layer of coverage for losses that exceed the limits of a primary liability policy.  
Coverage under an excess policy thus is triggered when the liability limits of the underlying primary 
insurance policy have been exhausted.”); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 
202, 209 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Texas law dictates that primary policies’ limits must be exhausted before 
excess insurers become liable.”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. 
Co., 885 F. Supp. 202, 205 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (“‘Excess’ or secondary coverage is coverage whereby, 
under the terms of the policy, liability attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary 
coverage has been exhausted.”  (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olympic Ins. Co. v. 
Emp’rs Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981))); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. 
v. Int’l Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 1170, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“Excess insurance ‘kicks in’ to provide 
additional coverage once the policy limits of other available insurance are exhausted.”). 
 88. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination 
Proceeding No. 1072, at 30–32 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1988), in 2-21 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS. 
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Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, the San Francisco Superior Court 
held that the non-cumulation clause at issue was ambiguous “at best” and 
noted that, although the “insurers argue that the non-cumulation clauses 
are clear and unambiguous, they interpret the clauses differently.”89 
B. The “Reasonable Expectations” Doctrine 
Another staple of insurance policy interpretation law is that the 
policy should be interpreted to allow the coverage to fulfill the 
“reasonable expectations” of the policyholder.90  More than forty years 
ago, then-Professor Robert Keeton wrote a seminal article regarding the 
“reasonable expectations” doctrine.91  In his subsequent treatise, then-
Judge Keeton summarized the doctrine as follows: 
In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, 
insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by 
insurance contracts even though a careful examination of the policy  
provisions indicates that such expectations are contrary to the expressed 
intention of the insurer.92 
                                                                                                                       
(Sept. 14, 1988).  See also Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., C.A. No. 1465-VCS, 2009 WL 
3297559, at *29 n.165 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2009) (recognizing the complexity of applying non-
cumulation clauses in the multiple-insurer context). 
 89. No. 1072 at 31–32. 
 90. See, e.g., 1 BROOK ET AL., supra note 74, § 2.02[1]; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, 
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(3) (Student ed. 1988); 4 LONG, supra note 74, § 16.07; 1 OSTRAGER & 
NEWMAN, supra note 74, § 1.03[b][2][B] (identifying courts in forty-two states that have expressed 
support for, or applied a form of, the reasonable expectations doctrine); 2 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra 
note 74, § 22-11; STEMPEL, supra note 74, §§ 11.1–2.  Courts recognize the doctrine.  See, e.g., AIU 
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (en banc) (noting that ambiguous 
coverage clauses of insurance policies are to be interpreted broadly to “protect[] the objectively 
reasonable expectations of the insured”); Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 623, 
625 (Ga. 1995) (“A contract of insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in 
favor of coverage in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); A.B.C. Builders, 
Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H. 1995) (“[T]he policy language must be so 
clear as to create no ambiguity which might affect the insured’s reasonable expectations.’”  (quoting 
Cacavas v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 512 A.2d 423, 425 (N.H. 1986))); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Century Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 824 P.2d 302, 308 (N.M. 1992) (noting that the court will give effect to 
policyholder’s reasonable expectations in construing policy language); Mills v. Agrichemical 
Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671–73 (N.D. 1977) (invoking doctrine of reasonable expectations 
to discern intentions of parties and impose liability on insurer). 
 91. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 961 (1970). 
 92. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 90, at 633.  For commentary regarding the reasonable 
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As Professor Mootz more recently commented, “[i]n other words, even 
when the policy language unambiguously precludes coverage, under 
certain circumstances, courts will hold that coverage exists.”93 
Stated differently, the policyholder should receive coverage that 
matches its objectively reasonable expectations even if the policy 
language does not expressly support such coverage.  Thus, for example, a 
policyholder that is in the business of selling products can reasonably 
expect that it will receive coverage for product liability claims related to 
those products when it buys commercial general liability insurance for 
purposes of insuring itself against product liability claims.  So, in 
oversimplified terms, if an insurer sells and accepts premiums for 
insurance that covers product liability claims, then courts generally 
should interpret the policy to cover product liability claims regardless of 
the insurer’s interpretation of the policy or which exclusions the insurer 
argues should apply. 
                                                                                                                       
expectations doctrine, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: 
Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Roger C. 
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (providing a detailed historical account of the doctrine and asserting that 
the doctrine is principled and can be applied within justiciable guidelines); Robert H. Jerry II, 
Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21 (1998) 
(discussing the doctrine as conceptualized by Keeton); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable 
Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 287–96 (1986) (formulating 
standards for applying the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 
CONN. L. REV. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing for refinements based on the doctrine’s allegedly fading 
appeal and contending that courts should “discard their unfortunate tendency to speak the platitudes 
of reasonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic analysis”).  While there is 
broad acceptance of the doctrine, judicial interpretation and application of the doctrine varies.  See 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations 
Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 182–83, 191 
(1998) (describing judicial approaches and noting both liberal and narrow approaches among the 
numerous states that have adopted the doctrine); Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus 
Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 
(2000) (exploring judicial responses and proposing a middle ground approach); Laurie Kindel Fett, 
Note, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative to Bending and Stretching Traditional 
Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1113 (1992) (exploring the doctrine 
under Minnesota law); Scott B. Krider, Comment, The Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts Under 
the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 155 (1984) (arguing that 
regulatory efforts address the underlying problems in the insurance industry in a manner superior to 
judicial use of reasonable expectations); William Mark Lashner, Note, A Common Law Alternative 
to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1175, 1208 (1982) (arguing that “any provision which undercuts the bargained-for insurance 
coverage must [be] specifically explained to the insured” to be enforceable); Stephen J. Ware, 
Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989) 
(providing a “law and economics” critique of the doctrine). 
 93. Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 22 (1997). 
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So, how does this doctrine apply to non-cumulation clauses?  Well, 
in general, a policyholder can reasonably expect to receive payment of 
the full amount of the loss up to the policy limits despite the presence of 
a non-cumulation clause if the policyholder both paid a premium for the 
policy94 and won determination that a covered loss triggered the policy. 
C. The Construction of the Policy as a Whole 
The third policy interpretation principle applicable to non-
cumulation clauses provides that, if possible, courts should interpret the 
policy in a way that attempts to reconcile the various provisions of the 
policy and attempts to give effect to all of the policy’s provisions.95  In 
                                                     
 94. Although automobile insurance is a much more heavily regulated area of insurance law that 
largely is governed by statutes and public policy rather than policy wording, numerous courts 
throughout the country have held that, despite policy language which purportedly limits a 
policyholder’s recovery to a single policy limit, policyholders can recover multiple policy limits—or 
“stack” limits—in automobile insurance policies where the policyholder paid a separate premium for 
each policy limit and, therefore, is entitled to receive the benefit of the bargain.  See, e.g., N. River 
Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 934 F.2d 461, 466 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The other main reason cited by the 
Pennsylvania courts in striking down anti-stacking provisions is protection of the reasonable 
expectations of the insured.  This reflects the concept that the insured, having paid multiple 
premiums, is entitled reasonably to believe that he has multiple coverage . . . .”); Sturdy v. Allied 
Mut. Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 34, 42 (Kan. 1969) (“When [one] pay[s] a double premium [one] expect[s] 
double coverage.”), superseded by statute, Act of Apr. 24, 1981, ch. 192, § 1(d), 1981 Kan. Sess. 
Laws 836 (1981) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(d)), as recognized in Farmers Ins. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 802 P.2d 556 (1990); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dicke, 862 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ky. 1993) (rejecting 
an anti-stacking provision because “when separate items of ‘personal’ insurance are bought and paid 
for, there is a reasonable expectation that the coverage will be provided”); Chaffin v. Ky. Farm 
Bureau Ins. Cos., 789 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Ky. 1990) (stating that public policy requires that a 
policyholder has a reasonable expectation that payment of separate premiums results in separate 
coverages); Jimenez v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 792, 794 (N.M. 1988) (finding stacking 
appropriate based upon the reasonable expectations of the insured who purchased multiple 
coverages); Wilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla. 1996) (holding that insured could 
stack underinsured benefits under two policies where insurance company collected higher premium 
for two cars which was almost double the premium charged for single-car coverage); Schult v. Rural 
Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where insured paid separate 
premiums he was entitled to stack coverage regardless of anti-stacking clauses). 
 95. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (requiring that courts 
interpret a contract as a whole); Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (applying New York law and finding that “an interpretation that gives a reasonable and 
effective meaning to all the terms of a contract is generally preferred to one that leaves a part 
unreasonable or of no effect”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. 146, 155–
56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“In short, an insurance contract ‘is to be construed in a manner which gives 
meaning to all its provisions in a natural, reasonable, and practical manner, having reference to the 
risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire contract.’”  (quoting Barrett v. Farmers Ins. 
Grp., 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985))); Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 319 
N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill. 1974) (stating provisions in an insurance policy should be interpreted in 
context of entire policy). 
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essence, this principle requires that courts, if possible, give effect to all 
of the policy’s provisions in a way that is consistent with the purpose of 
the policy as a whole. 
So how does this doctrine apply to a clause that is hopelessly 
ambiguous and is interpreted by some insurers in a way that is contrary 
to the reasonable expectations of the policyholder?  As is further 
discussed below in Part V, non-cumulation clauses should be treated in 
the same way that “other insurance” clauses have been applied, because 
“other insurance” clauses purportedly serve a similar function as non-
cumulation clauses—i.e., they attempt to shift liability from one insurer 
to another insurer.  Of course, “other insurance” clauses should not 
impact the recovery of the policyholder, but, instead, only should come 
into play when insurers fight among themselves to apportion the 
liability.96  Indeed, to the extent the clause would allow an insurer to 
“escape” liability for a loss to the detriment of the policyholder, 
numerous courts have held such a result is impermissible.97 
One version of an “other insurance” clause is known as an “excess” 
                                                     
 96. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding 
that under “all sums” allocation, an “other insurance” clause does not prohibit the policyholder from 
selecting the policy to respond, but rather permits an insurer to seek contribution from other 
insurers); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1049–50 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that 
“other insurance” provisions of each policy provide a scheme by which the insurer’s liability is to be 
apportioned, rather than saddle a single insurer with full liability); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. 
Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 942 (Cal. 1997) (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(disapproving of the majority’s holding that other insurance clauses were without effect under “all 
sums” scheme); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 770, 794–
95 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1995) (holding that it is within insured’s discretion to select which triggered 
policy will be obligated to pay in full on a particular claim); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508–09 (Pa. 1993) (finding “that each insurer [that] was on the risk . . . is a 
primary insurer” and that the insured “should be free to select the policy or policies under which it is 
to be indemnified”). 
 97. See, e.g., Greene, Tweed & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 03-
3637, 2006 WL 1050110, at *13–16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006) (holding a non-cumulation clause 
invalid as an unenforceable escape clause because its operation under the circumstances of the case 
would have totally abrogated coverage for the policyholder); UTI Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 
896 F. Supp. 362, 378–79 (D.N.J. 1995) (invalidating non-cumulation clause as an unenforceable 
escape clause, stating that it is “‘unacceptable for an insurance company to provide no coverage 
under a policy for which it received premiums’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Contrans, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 836 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1987))); Varian Assocs., Inc. 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 944196, at 30–31 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1997), in 11-11 MEALEY’S LITIG. 
REP.: INS. (Jan. 21, 1997) (refusing to enforce non-cumulation clause that purports “to reduce or 
eliminate the limits of liability of a policy because of the existence of other insurance covering the 
same loss” as a disfavored “escape clause”); In re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, Judicial 
Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, at 30–32 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1988), in 2-21 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS. (Sept. 14, 1988) (declining to apply a non-cumulation provision because 
it was (1) ambiguous; (2) merely another form of “other insurance” clause; and (3) difficult if not 
impossible to apply in the context of thousands of asbestos-related bodily injury claims). 
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“other insurance” clause, which typically provides that coverage is not 
available under the policy until the loss at issue exceeds the amount of 
insurance provided by other policies.98  “Excess” “other insurance” 
clauses commonly are worded as follows: “If there is other insurance 
against a loss covered under this policy the insurance provided under this 
policy shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible 
insurance.”99 
Another type of “other insurance” clause is known as an “escape” 
clause, which sometimes is worded as follows: “Provided that where the 
Assured is, irrespective of this insurance, covered or protected against 
any loss or claim which would otherwise have been paid by the Assurer, 
under this policy, there shall be no contribution by the Assurer on the 
basis of double insurance or otherwise.”100 
When two or more policies cover a policyholder’s loss or liability 
                                                     
 98. See Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in “Other Insurance,” Multiple Insurance, 
and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1385 (1995) (noting that an excess clause provides that 
an insurer will pay a loss only after other available insurance is exhausted).  See also Ind. Ins. Co. v. 
Mission Nat’l Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying Washington law); Hennes 
Erecting Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 813 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(applying Kansas law); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. United Int’l Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 1470, 1473–74 
(M.D. Ala. 1990) (applying Alabama law), aff’d, 932 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir. 1991); Progressive Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 15, 17–18 (D. Me. 1990) (applying Maine law); Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (applying Pennsylvania 
law); Ark. Poultry Fed’n Ins. Trust v. Lawrence, 805 S.W.2d 653, 660–61 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991); 
CSE Ins. Grp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 122–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); 
Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1199 (Colo. 1988); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Exec. Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 494 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1986); Ga. Mut. Ins. Co. v. S. 
Gen. Ins. Co., 351 S.E.2d 658, 659–60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Cont’l Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life 
& Cas. Co., 542 N.E.2d 954, 956–58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp., 
866 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Motor Club of Iowa Ins. Co. v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 508 
N.W.2d 634, 637–38 (Iowa 1993); Dean v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 So. 2d 1115, 1118 
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1220, 1224 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Nat’l Indem. Co. v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 489 N.W.2d 175, 176 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam); Polenz v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 419 N.W.2d 677, 684 
(Neb. 1988); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 515, 516–17 (N.H. 
1991); Rogers v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 639 A.2d 1154, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); 
Lumber Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 429 S.E.2d 406, 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Erie Ins. 
Grp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 585 N.E.2d 464, 471–72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 353 S.E.2d 894, 896–97 (Va. 1987). 
 99. Kahn, supra note 87, at 595 (citing Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 147 
A.2d 529 (N.J. 1959)).  Another variation provides “[t]he insurance under this policy shall be excess 
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance available to the insured, either as an insured 
under another policy or otherwise.”  Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co., 147 A.2d at 531 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 100. Elf Exploration, Inc. v. Cameron Offshore Boats, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 386, 392 (E.D. Tex. 
1994). 
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and contain an “other insurance” clause similar to the examples above—
which, along with non-cumulation clauses, purport to avoid or shift 
coverage obligations to other insurers—then courts generally consider 
the clauses to be mutually repugnant101 and, thus, unenforceable.102  In 
such circumstances, after the policyholder has been paid in full, the 
courts then prorate the loss or liability between the triggered policy 
years.103 
According to some commentators, “other insurance” clauses are also 
really intended only to “prevent double recoveries by insureds.”104  
Consequently, “[g]iven the purpose of the ‘other insurance’ clauses, 
these provisions do not provide any contractual basis for allocating a 
                                                     
 101. Insurance policy provisions are “mutually repugnant” if the enforcement of one of them 
precludes the enforcement of the other.  See, e.g., Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Pike, 977 F.2d 
1278, 1279–80 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that both insurers’ escape clauses “are mutually 
repugnant and both policies will share pro rata liability”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gen. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 210 So. 2d 688, 694–96 (Ala. 1968) (finding that policies containing mutually 
repugnant “excess insurance” clauses should share the loss through apportionment); Empire Cas. Co. 
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1199 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (voiding competing 
insurers’ “other insurance” clauses); Buckson v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 97C-04-009, 1999 
Del. Super. LEXIS 301, at *13–14 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 1999) (finding competing policies’ 
“other insurance” provisions to be “mutually repugnant” and therefore void); Rogers, 639 A.2d at 
1160 (finding other insurance clauses to be mutually repugnant); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Or. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 110, 118–19 (Or. 1959) (holding that when any “escape” or “excess” clauses 
come in conflict with another “other insurance” clause, they are mutually repugnant). 
 102. See, e.g., Car & Truck Leasing, 494 So. 2d at 489 (finding that conflicting excess insurance 
policies “cancel each other out” and result in pro rata apportionment); Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 578 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Iowa 1998) (“[W]hen confronted with mutually 
repugnant excess or escape clauses, the loss must be prorated between the insurers in accordance 
with the policy limits.”); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 708 N.E.2d 167, 170 
(N.Y. 1999) (“[I]f . . . two policies are excess to one another, the two ‘other insurance’ clauses 
cancel each other out and the companies must apportion the costs . . . on a pro rata basis.”); Iodice v. 
Jones, 514 S.E.2d 291, 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (“Where it is impossible to determine which policy 
provides primary coverage due to identical ‘excess’ clauses, ‘the clauses are deemed mutually 
repugnant and neither . . . will be given effect.’”  (quoting N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Hilliard, 369 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1998))); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 361 
N.E.2d 1052, 1053–54 (Ohio 1977) (“Since there can be no primary insurance of the risk where 
there are conflicting excess clauses, the excess clauses a fortiori cannot be a valid means of 
establishing only ‘secondary’ liability.”); see also 8A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, 
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4909 (1981); James R. Adams, Other Insurance in 4 THE LAW OF 
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 22.04[1] n.3 (Sally A. Swiss ed., 1999).  Many courts recognize pro rata 
allocation of the loss.  Ind. Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 634 (“[I]f there are two policies of excess insurance 
and a literal construction of each policy would mean that neither would have to pay, the policies are 
mutually repugnant and a court will construe the contracts to require each insurer to pay its 
appropriate share.”). 
 103. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 104. John H. Mathias, Jr., John D. Shugrue, & Brian C. Bendig, Allocation: J.H. France and the 
Insureds’ Right to Select from Multiple Triggered Policies, COVERAGE, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 19, 22. 
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portion of the insured’s loss to [the insured].”105  Thus, “other insurance” 
clauses are really intended to allow “equitable contribution” between and 
among insurers after one or more of the insurers has paid the 
policyholder’s claim in full.106 
The reasoning of these commentators and the decisions discussed 
and cited in this Part regarding “other insurance” clauses apply equally to 
non-cumulation clauses.  Non-cumulation clauses similarly purport to 
shift the liability for a loss from the policy at issue to other policies 
issued in prior years, so the same principles apply.  Consequently, such 
clauses should be understood to be intended only to prevent “double 
recoveries” by policyholders, and thus, the clauses only allow for 
“equitable contribution” between and among insurers after the 
policyholder’s claim has been paid in full by one or more of the insurers. 
V. HOW COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET AND APPLY NON-CUMULATION 
CLAUSES TO LONG-TAIL CLAIMS 
With this factual and legal background in mind, one can ascertain a 
framework for the courts’ interpretation and application of non-
cumulation clauses in the context of long-tail claims.  The framework has 
two primary components. 
A. Courts Should Construe Non-Cumulation Clauses in Favor of 
Policyholders 
The first part of the framework provides that, because many versions 
of the clause are hopelessly ambiguous when applied to long-tail claims 
for all of the reasons discussed above, courts should interpret them in 
favor of the policyholder.  Indeed, because the courts that have 
interpreted and applied a non-cumulation clause have reached different 
conclusions as to its meaning and application, such clauses generally 
must be ambiguous.107  Further, such a result is consistent with the 
                                                     
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 21. 
 107. See, e.g., Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Investors Diversified Ltd., 407 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance company contends that the language is not ambiguous, but we 
cannot agree and offer as proof of that pudding the fact that the Supreme Court of California and the 
Fifth Circuit in New Orleans have arrived at opposite conclusions from a study of essentially the 
same language.”); Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 908 (Kan. 1989) (“[T]he 
reported cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the Court of Appeals reached different conclusions 
and the justices of this court [disagree].  Under such circumstances, the clause is, by definition, 
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reasonable expectations of the policyholder, who can and should expect 
its insurers to pay for covered losses instead of attempting to shift their 
coverage obligations to other insurers.  Consequently, under well-
established insurance law regarding policy interpretation, courts should 
construe non-cumulation clauses in favor of coverage for the 
policyholder. 
Such a result should come as no surprise to insurers.  Even one of the 
London underwriters responsible for the London version of the clause 
that is still found in many policies today has acknowledged that long-tail 
claims had not yet been recognized when the clause was drafted and 
allocation rules, such as “all sums” allocation, did not exist.108  Thus, the 
clause could not have been intended to apply to long-tail claims—such as 
asbestos bodily injury and environmental property damage—under 
current allocation rules.  To the contrary, the drafters originally intended 
only to prevent a policyholder from receiving a double recovery by 
accessing coverage under differently worded policy forms as the 
insurance industry transitioned from one policy form to another in the 
early 1960s.109 
This conclusion also comports with the various states’ allocation 
laws.  In jurisdictions that have adopted “all sums” allocation, if non-
cumulation clauses were applied as requested by certain insurers, then 
the policyholder would be stripped of its right to select the policy year 
that will provide coverage because the insurers could effectively veto the 
policyholder’s selection.  Similarly, in pro rata allocation jurisdictions, 
the insurers already have been given a discount on their obligations to the 
policyholder because they are only being held responsible for a portion 
of the policyholder’s liabilities. 
Moreover, applying non-cumulation clauses as requested by the 
                                                                                                                       
ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we assume that all courts adopt a 
reasonable construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that the word as so used is susceptible of at 
least two reasonable interpretations, one of which extends the coverage to the situation at hand.”); 
George H. Olmsted & Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 161 N.E. 276, 277–78 (Ohio 1928) (“[T]he fact 
that [the] authority is in irreconcilable conflict, . . . coupled with the fact that the lower courts in the 
instant case are in disagreement . . . , presents [a] persuasive argument of the ambiguity of the 
clause . . . .”); Cohen v. Erie Indem., Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The mere fact 
that [courts differ on the construction of the provision] itself creates the inescapable conclusion that 
the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation.”).  See also 1 BROOK ET AL., 
supra note 74, § 2.02[1]; STEMPEL, supra note 74, § 5.8; 4 LONG, supra note 74, § 16.06; Marvel, 
supra note 76, at 1253. 
 108. Wilson Deposition I, supra note 21, at 98–100. 
 109. Id. at 76–78, 89–90, 158.  See also Fields, supra note 24, at 32–34. 
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insurers would be inconsistent with public policy, which encourages 
settlements.110  If a policyholder were required to “credit” either the 
amounts it has received in settlements or the entire policy limits of the 
settled policies toward the policy limits of non-settling insurers’ policies 
in later policy years, then the policyholder would have little or no 
incentive to settle.  Conversely, if holdout insurers could reduce their 
policies’ limits by amounts paid by settling insurers in earlier policy 
years or the entire policy limits of prior-incepting policies that are 
settled, then insurers would have an incentive to hold out instead of 
settling. 
In short, so long as the policyholder does not receive a double 
recovery, then the policyholder should receive the benefit of its bargain 
with its insurers, which did, after all, receive a premium for the policy. 
B. Courts Should Treat Non-Cumulation Clauses Like “Other 
Insurance” Clauses 
The second part of the framework provides that, because they 
purport to shift liability for a loss from one policy to other policies, non-
cumulation clauses are just another variation of “other insurance” clauses 
that commonly are found in commercial general liability policies.  
Consequently, they should be given the same effect as “other insurance” 
clauses.  As an initial matter, as discussed above in Part IV.C., “other 
insurance” clauses should not impact the policyholder’s recovery.111  As 
                                                     
 110. See, e.g., Deleonardis v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., No. 93-2856, 1994 WL 
499623, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 1994) (noting that settlement is favored and encouraged by the 
court); Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We favor 
and encourage settlements in order to conserve judicial resources.”); Justine Realty Co. v. Am. Nat’l 
Can Co., 976 F.2d 385, 391 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting preference for settlement); United States v. 
Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting public policy to encourage 
settlement); Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154, 1164 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[P]ublic policy 
favors voluntary settlements which obviate the need for expensive and time-consuming litigation.”); 
Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting principle that settlements are 
favored); Miles v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (stating that 
settlement is favored to conserve judicial resources); Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Farm, 
Inc., No. 605CV062, 2008 WL 4421398, at *1 (S.D. Ga., Sept. 29, 2008) (noting court’s “duty to 
uphold social policy favoring settlement”); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 692 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting preference for settlement in CERCLA litigation). 
 111. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding 
that under “all sums” allocation, an “other insurance” clause does not prohibit the policyholder from 
selecting the policy to respond, but rather permits an insurer to seek contribution from other 
insurers); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that the 
insured can collect from any triggered insurer and liability is apportioned among all); Greene, Tweed 
& Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 03-3637, 2006 WL 1050110, at *13–16 
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a result, such clauses only impact the allocation of the loss among 
insurers after the policyholder has been paid in full. 
Further, in contribution actions between insurers, the doctrines of 
contra proferentem and “reasonable expectations” do not necessarily 
apply because the dispute is between insurers, not an insurer and a 
policyholder.112  Thus, many of the arguments set forth in this Article 
regarding the interpretation of non-cumulation clauses with respect to the 
policyholder do not apply in actions between insurers. 
With that said, in contribution actions between insurers, a court 
should allocate the loss in accordance with the jurisdiction’s law relating 
to allocation and “other insurance” clauses.  If, for example, all of the 
policies at issue contain non-cumulation clauses, then courts in “all 
sums” and pro rata jurisdictions should allocate the loss on a pro rata 
basis between the insurers because the non-cumulation clauses are 
mutually repugnant.113  If the policies do not all contain non-cumulation 
clauses, then courts in an “all sums” jurisdiction should apply the clause 
in favor of the later-issued policies to the extent that there are no 
competing policy provisions that would change the result.  In pro rata 
jurisdictions, the insurers already have received a discount from their full 
                                                                                                                       
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006) (finding “non-cumulation” clause unenforceable); UTI Corp. v. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 362, 378–79 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding “other insurance” clause 
unenforceable); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 942 (Cal. 1997) (Chin, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing majority holding as finding other insurance clauses were without effect 
under “all sums” scheme); Varian Assoc., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 944196, at 30–31 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1997) in 11-11 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS. (Jan. 21, 1997) (finding “other 
insurance” clause to be a partial escape clause and giving it no effect); In re Asbestos Insurance 
Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, at 30–32 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 
29, 1988), in 2-21 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS. (Sept. 14, 1988) (giving “non-cumulation” clauses no 
effect); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 770, 794–95 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. 1995) (finding “other insurance” clause does not require pro rata allocation of liability); 
J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 508–09 (Pa. 1993) (finding insured 
can select insurers from which to seek indemnification). 
 112. See, e.g., Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 
43 (2d Cir. 2006) (implying that contra proferentem only applies to ambiguity questions about 
policy between insurer and policyholder); James v. Zurich-Am. Ins. Co. of Ill., 203 F.3d 250, 258 
(3d Cir. 2000) (noting that contra proferentem construction applies when contract dispute is between 
the insurer and its insured); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 408 P.2d 596, 598 (Kan. 
1965) (finding that in a dispute between two insurance companies, the court does not apply the rule 
of liberal interpretation that is necessary to protect a policyholder); Boston Ins. Co. v. Fawcett, 258 
N.E.2d 771, 776 (Mass. 1970) (noting that contra proferentem does not apply where “all the parties 
to the litigation are large insurance companies long engaged in far-flung activities in that field of 
economic activity”).  But see Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Gen. Trucking Co., 423 So. 2d 168, 
171 (Ala. 1982) (justifying a construction against an insurer even where both parties are equally 
informed insurers). 
 113. See, e.g., supra note 101. 
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policy obligations, so the clause would not apply.114  In jurisdictions such 
as New Jersey, which apply pro rata time on the risk allocation,115 the 
court should allocate the loss among the various triggered policies based 
upon the percentage of total insurance provided by each insurer. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The manner in which courts allocate long-tail claim liabilities raises 
critical questions in complex, multi-party litigation and has a significant 
impact on the financial obligations of the parties involved.  Certain 
insurers’ attempts to use non-cumulation clauses to reduce or eliminate 
their financial obligations for long-tail claims—such as asbestos bodily 
injury claims and environmental property damage claims—should be 
rejected with respect to the amount ultimately paid to the policyholder.  
Many versions of the clause are hopelessly ambiguous when applied to 
such claims under current insurance concepts such as continuous trigger 
and “all sums” allocation, which did not exist when the clauses were 
drafted.  Nor was the existence of long-tail claims even recognized as 
such at the time the clauses were drafted.  Consequently, non-cumulation 
clauses, such as the London version, were only intended to prevent the 
policyholder from obtaining a double recovery where two different types 
of policies covered the same loss.  If such clauses have any relevance 
today, it is only for purposes of allocating losses among insurers after the 
policyholder has been made whole.  Indeed, because non-cumulation 
clauses essentially are a variation on “other insurance” clauses, they 
should be treated like “other insurance” clauses and should not be 
applied to reduce the coverage that a policy otherwise affords. 
                                                     
 114. See, e.g., Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 819 A.2d 410, 422 (N.J. 
2003) (“Once the court turns to pro rata allocation, it makes sense that the non-cumulation clause, 
which would allow the insurer to avoid its fair share of responsibility, drops out of the policy.”). 
 115. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1124 (N.J. 1998) (allocating 
coverage among multiple liability insurers in proportion to the degree of the risks transferred or 
retained during the years of exposure). 
